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Abstract
The communication of emotion in music has with few exceptions, as L. B. Meyer´s Emotion
and Meaning in Music (1956) and the contour theory (Kivy 1989, 2002), focused on music
structure as representations of emotions. This implies a semiotic approach - the assumption
that music is a kind of language that could be read and decoded. Such an approach is largely
restricted to the conscious level of knowing, understanding and communication. We suggest
an understanding of music and emotion based on action-perception theory - present moment
perception, implicit knowledge and imitation. This theory does not demand consciousness or
the use of signs. Neuroscientific findings (adaptive oscillators, mirror neurons) are in
concordance with our suggestion. Recently these findings have generated articles on empathy
– relevant to the understanding of music and emotion. Key words: empathy, implicit
knowledge, imitation, entrainment, mirror neurons, perceptual learning.
Intro
An obvious and intriguing aspect of music is its ability to communicate emotion. How this is
done is a very old question. It has been an interest of many scientific fields such as
philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and musicology (Juslin & Sloboda 2001). Since the
1970s we have witnessed a semiotic approach to address this subject. The flow of music has
been stopped and fragmentized into structural factors - elements carrying meaning (Tagg
1979). Obviously there are events and sounds in music that could be analysed as signs. But,
the semiotic side is certainly weaker in music than in ordinary language. It is just as true to
say that a walk in the forest is semiotic, since almost anything could be taken as a sign of
something else, if we choose that perspective: traces of animals, signs of season, signs of
2geology, signs of meteorology, signs of God’s creation, nature as poetic metaphor of the soul
etc. Even if music is semiotic, it is not just semiotic. It is, as is the forest, also a reality of its
own, and is perceived so.
The Swedish film director Ingemar Bergman recently played suite nr 6 in D-major for
violoncello by Johan Sebastian Bach on the radio. Then he asked: “Can anybody tell me –
Why do we have music? Man is the only species who has music. Can anybody answer this
question? I am not religious, but I think we have received music as a gift to give us an idea of
other worlds than the one we inhabit”.  Implicit in the question is the recognition that Bach is
not signifying this world. We have to admit the suite is not telling us much about the world
we know. It is just imagined beauty.
Action-perception theory
We need to ask: Are we, in everyday listening, really perceiving music as signs to be
decoded? Could it be the other way around: that everything in the present moment
(motivation, intention, state of mind, and memories of all kinds) is automatically affecting our
perception of music? This makes listening to music spontaneous and emotional – a lived
experience rather than a decoding of signs. The difference is that we enjoy music as such – as
melody development, harmonies and rhythms, just as we can enjoy nature without “reading
it”. The philosophical consequence of this approach is that if music is not a sign of emotion,
the emotion some way or other has to be inherent in the music heard. We intend to discuss
this. In the following we will outline a theoretical framework for the analysis of the
perception of music and its emotional implications. This framework is built of elements from
many works in several different research traditions. What unifies them is the emphasis on the
dynamical nature of perception and the close connections between perception and action.
Hence we have drawn from Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness, from the early
psychological perception-action theories of Lipps and Rorschach, from Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of perception and action, from the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson, and
from recent theorists and experimentalists in the fields of child psychology, ethology,
neuropsychology and neurophysiology.
3The temporality aspect is crucial. Daniel Stern’s concept the present moment is based on
Edmund Husserl’s intentional arc which implies:
… being aware of what I have just seen, heard or thought – retention – as well
as anticipating somehow a continuation of what I am now seeing, hearing or
thinking – protention. (Stern 2004)
The present moment is thus not just momentary presence but a time span framing perception.
This includes an experience of what we just lived and an anticipation and intention based on
what just happened. The usual span of the present moment has been estimated to 2-4 seconds
– the length of a breath and thus the length of a phrase. It is the dividing line between
experiencing the world directly (“live” and “on-line”) and indirectly as the world symbolized
(talked about or thought about). It is our window to life. Since the perceived moment has
some expansion in time, we can perceive movements and actions – life as a process. And in
fact we can perceive time itself as durations.
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It is just not possible or useful to be aware of everything in the present moment. As we
perceive, we focus our attention to something that becomes figure of our perception. The rest
is background. We are aware of the figure but not of the background. If something happens in
the background, such as a false note in the violins, or a child crossing the street in front of our
car while we are speaking on the cell phone, we direct our attention to it and it becomes figure
(cf also Malmgren 2004).
We wish to stress that under the semiotic level of knowing and understanding, there is an
immediate “perceive-and-act” level of knowing and understanding, designed to enable species
to live in their environment. Perception is intertwined with action. We act on what we
perceive, we learn to perceive by our interactions with the world (i.e. the infant’s cross-modal
exploration of the world), and we have to act to perceive (move our eyes, walk around, turn
our heads etc.). The knowledge how to move is called procedural knowledge by today’s
psychologists (see, e.g., Snyder 2000:33) or (following the philosopher Ryle) knowledge-how,
as opposed to declarative knowledge or knowledge-that (Ryle 1949). Procedural knowledge is
mainly a kind of implicit knowledge in that it need not involve consciousness. The acquisition
of procedural knowledge by experience is called procedural memory. Perceptual memory, or
4the way perception is modified by experience, is similar to procedural memory in many
respects. Not only because perception usually involves perceiving action possibilities, but also
in its purely sensory aspects. When one has finally succeeded in perceiving a certain
ambiguous figure as a definite Gestalt, the same perception will automatically reappear when
one sees the same figure in the future, without any conscious act of interpreting.
In several pathological conditions, declarative and procedural knowledge are dissociated from
each other.  Merleau-Ponty describes a case with a man who suffered from a brain injury
(Merleau-Ponty 1945). This man could not, when asked to, put his hand on his head (although
he clearly understood the instruction), but when a fly landed on his head, he smashed it. The
conclusion is that although he could not do it deliberately, his body knew how to do it, when
the lived situation demanded so. Procedural knowledge is bodily skill (stored in the nervous
system). It is the knowledge how to walk, move the mouth as we speak, ride a bike etc. -
actions we are normally not conscious of. It includes knowledge of the space and terrain we
move in; how to reach, catch and find our way. Some actions, like the newborn calf’s ability
to walk, are inborn, some are learned by imitation, and some are consciously learned but
become automated after practice. Most of these abilities are too complicated to be taught by
communication of signs, or even consciously understood. They contain too much information
for our rather limited capacity to consciously hold and handle information. We could try to
teach a child about the physical mechanisms at play in bicycling, or to verbally describe all
the movements she has to perform, but this would not make the child able to ride the bike.
Neonates (30 minutes!) have been proven to imitate mouth movements (Meltzoff & Moore
1987). Findings like these have been rejected by some cognitive psychologists as paradoxes
since these children could not possibly represent another person’s face. This is because
imitation, as they understand it, involves a separation of the self from the other and thus has to
be conscious. But the child does not seem to care, it still imitates. Therefore we must accept
that this imitation is inborn primary behaviour and that conscious understanding of the
relation of self and other is a secondary capacity. The conclusion is that there are two kinds of
imitation: one hardwired instant imitation and one intended conscious imitation.
5Symbolization makes it possible to see our self from the outside. This leads to a cleft between
the subject as the one living in the world and the subject as the one being aware of this
subject. The symbol is the tool separating the “I” from the “you”, the “I” from the “world”
and finally the “I” from the one denoting herself “I” (the ontological cleft, the loss of
innocence - expulsion from paradise). Symbolization liberates us from the present moment
and makes it possible to actualize things and events not present. By means of symbolization
we are able to talk and think (we can also think in images). When we are thinking we are not
really there, not really present, since we are out on a little journey in our thoughts. And thus:
In the conscious movement, the velocity is slower and accuracy is poorer.  This
means that you have lost the on-line control of the movement, which works
automatically: instead, you have used a system that is slower and is not adapted
to doing automatic movement. (Jeannerod & Gallagher 2002: )
The knowledge on this conscious level is called explicit. Explicit knowledge is not limited to
conscious knowledge how to do things, but includes most of our knowledge about fact and
events. Knowledge about facts is called semantic or declarative. It is our knowledge about the
world, learnt by verbal communication through teachers and media. Knowledge about
personally experienced events is called episodic - memories of lived experiences of present
moments. A well known example of episodic memories is Marcel Proust’s memory from
childhood, triggered by the taste of a Madeleine biscuit soaked with lime blossom tea. As in
the case of Proust, these memories are often brought to consciousness by our senses – a scent,
a melody. Episodic memories may be partly constructed from knowledge categories and then
depend on semantic memories. And, when we construct a narrative from episodic memories,
as Proust did, they become totally semantic.
Conscious levels and unconscious levels work together in everyday action.
 We may be conscious about intentions, but not conscious about means.
  There is a connection between implicit and explicit knowledge: “With continuous,
regular use, concepts in semantic memory are evoked automatically, and hence
become implicit” says Snyder (2000), and exemplifies with the sight of an apple. This
sight would immediately and automatically actualize the word “apple”.
6 And contrary: The sound of the word “apple” automatically triggers sensory images
and bodily reactions. The conscious act of decoding is automated into the act of
perception.
  Spontaneous expressions can be consciously decoded and deliberate representations
can be perceived without conscious decoding.
 Implicit as well as explicit knowledge affects expression.
 Thus every level of awareness generates bodily expressions that can be perceived by
others.
How is emotion communicated?
In order to say that an emotion is communicated, the emotion of the other must somehow be
transmitted to the subject. On the conscious, representational level we can communicate the
truth (or the lie) that  we have a certain emotion. But this is not equivalent with
communicating the emotion.  There is a difference between listening to somebody telling us
she is happy and being affected by her smile. Sadly, we can be quite indifferent when
somebody tells us about her happiness.
We can see in herd living animals that they communicate by means of movements and
sounds, and that each species have their own inherited system. It is hard to see music as such
a system. But it seems as though music has much in common with prosody and body
language. We know that prosody, facial expression and body “language” (another language
which is not a language) are affecting us in interpersonal communication. These expressions
could be analysed as signs of emotion, but on the daily level we do not decode them. We are
merely contaminated by the other person’s expression. Perception does not separate
expression from emotion. We live the expression of the other as an emotion.
Prosody, facial expression and body language are all motor activities. Emotion is intertwined
with action in several ways, for example in the sense that emotion reflects motivation which is
thought to steer and moderate action. As animals move through the landscape, the affordances
(vital information in the environment, Gibson 1986:127) affect the bodily state of the animal
(hunger, thirst, fatigue, sexual drives, satisfaction, fear, rivalry etc.). And the bodily state
7affects perception. This interplay decides intention and steers action. Automatic two-way
connections exist between emotions and movements. When we scratch a dog behind the ear,
she starts kicking. And just by performing a facial expression mechanically, we get affected.
This feedback from the manifestation of an emotion to the emotion itself is one of the keys to
the understanding of the communication of emotions. Another key is immediate motor
identification: If a person is thirsty and drinks – we need to drink, if she vomits – it makes us
nauseous, if she urinates - we want to urinate, if she yawns – we have this sudden urge to
yawn, if she cries – it brings tears to our eyes, if she laughs – she makes us laugh, if she gets
angry – we might have a slight tendency to get angry too, if she sings a song – we tend to fall
in, if she tries to make 2m in a high jump – we “help” her by lifting our own leg (as noticed
already by Darwin 1872) if she loves us and gives us a hug – it is easy to love her back, and if
she is sexually aroused – it is hard to ignore her. Together these keys can explain how a
perceived manifestation of an emotion in another person can evoke that same emotion in me -
without any intermediaries in the form of conscious representations. We are contaminated by
the other’s basic actions. The action of the other triggers a spontaneous tendency to imitate,
and this tendency makes us feel the emotion.
Emotion is a complicated concept. It is hard to distinguish the nuances of feelings, moods,
drives, needs, motivation, relational bonds or attitude. There is an emotional aspect of all
these phenomena. What interests us is the communication aspect. As noticed by Gallese
(2003) this is implicit in the concept Empathy, originally a translation of the German word
‘Einfühlung’, used in the psychology of aesthetic experience
…to denote the relationship between an artwork and the observer, who
imaginatively projects himself/herself into the contemplated object. Lipps
(1903), who wrote extensively on empathy, extended the concept of Einfühlung
to the domain of intersubjectivity, which he characterized in terms of inner
imitation of the perceived movements of others. When I am watching an acrobat
walking on a suspended wire, Lipps notes, I feel myself so inside of him (ich
fühle mich so in ihm). (Gallese 2003: )
Here empathy is connected to the aesthetic art object and to intersubjectivity in general. It is
not restricted to a specified emotion such as sympathy or urge to assist. What are the
8mechanisms behind this transference of emotions from the observed to the observer (Scherer
1998)? Lipps theorizes that the essence of empathy is inner imitation of the perceived
movements of others. Similar thoughts were voiced by the psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach,
who argues that motor identification is involved even when we perceive human movement in
a static picture (Malmgren 2000), and by the philosopher Merleau-Ponty. As we shall see
later, the basic idea which unites Lipps, Rorschach and Merleau-Ponty has been extensively
confirmed by recent research in psychology and neurophysiology.
Stern (1993) identifies three independent registers of feeling:
1. Categorical affects. These are emotional states like the Darwinian basic
six (happiness, sorrow, fear, disgust, anger and surprise – detectable as
facial expressions). Primary, early affects are happiness, anger and
sadness. Happiness is developed very early in interpersonal relations
(returned smile). Anger and sadness are developed from distress –
happiness hindered. Considered secondary are affects of shame, guilt,
and embarrassment requiring self consciousness and consciousness of
the attention of others. 
ii
2. Vitality affects
iii
, captured by kinetic terms: “crescendo, decrescendo,
fading, exploding, bursting, elongated, pulsing, wavering, effortful and
easy”.
3. Relational affects (“being loved, esteemed, thought wonderful, special or
hated, and the feelings of being secure, safe, attached, alone, isolated, or
separated”).
The vitality affect is Stern’s most interesting contribution since it adds a dynamic aspect to the
understanding of emotion. It requires shared “almost identical capacities for temporal
discrimination” between the participants. Stern shows how emotions are cross modally
evoked, shared and regulated. The inner subjective qualities of feeling are displayed as form,
intensity and timing, observable and directly perceived as a physical expression of emotions.
For instance, the child smiles to her mother, the mother answers y-e-a-h in a smoothly arched
pitch form showing the rise and fall of the smile of the baby, meaning -  “Oh! This is pretty
9much how you must have felt, and I am showing you I know by matching the temporal
contour of my activity to yours” (Stern 1993). Intuitive motherese (the way mothers address
their babies) is universal. There is a focus in this conversation on the time course of the
feeling intensity, the temporal feeling shape (Stern 1995:87). The temporal feeling shape of
the observer will correspond to that of the observed, resulting in affective attunement - shared
affective states. This connects with experiments where light-dot displays were placed on
people in dark environments in order to capture pure movements (Cutting/Kozlowski 1997).
The results indicate that we are not only capable of recognizing the identity of a walking
person, but also the emotion of this person from pure movement observation (cheerful or
depressed and sad.) Other experiments show that temporal information is transferred
intermodally (Kamachi et al 2003).
Entrainment
An intriguing aspect of the communication of vitality affect is entrainment, referring to our
capacity to share the present moment dynamics and to synchronize movements with each
other. In fact we have to share the present moment to be able to apprehend the change in
intensity. We perceive each other on line. Emotional contagion has been defined (Hatfield et
al. 1994) as “the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions,
vocalizations, postures and movements with those of another person and, consequently, to
converge emotionally”. If we read this strictly, it seems that just by synchronizing, we share
the emotion. Although radical, it fits with the feedback connections between emotions and
their manifestations, described above. It is also in line with Stern’s observations. The
importance of the time factor was been verified in his video experiments of mothers presented
on screen to their babies. When a short time displacement between the baby’s utterance and
the mother’s reaction was made, the baby lost interest. Even if there is much more to explain
in this process, we cannot ignore that in a broad field of research entrainment is a condition
for communication of emotions. It is the common factor. As Stern notes neurological research
seem to substantiate the possibility of entrainment by the finding of so called adaptive
oscillators
…that act like clocks within our body…These inner clocks use the real-time
properties of incoming signals to “set” your adaptive oscillators, so that they
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immediately bring their own rate of neural firing into synch with the periodicity
of the incoming signal. (Stern 2004:)
For a mathematical analysis of adaptive oscillators see Zacksenhouse (2001). The oscillator
networks responsible for entrainment of musical rhythms seem to be widely distributed in the
brain (Thaut 2003).
Daniel Stern again:
…when people move synchronously or in temporal coordination, they are
participating in an aspect of each others experience. They are partly living from
the others centre. (ibid.:)
If two persons were to look at the same object and move until the object looks exactly the
same, they would end up standing inside one another. From this point everything looks the
same and feels the same what ever direction they look at. This seems to be what happens
when we share the present moment. The astonishing effect is that this makes us share
perspective not only of time but of the whole spectrum of perception. However, identification
in the real world is only a partial overlap. We are still able to distinguish ourselves from the
other.
The perspective of the other is crucial for empathy. Stern gives a striking example, taken from
Bråten (1999). Autistic children, by definition lacking in empathy, imitate, but not by putting
themselves in the other’s position. When a mother holds up her palms, children usually put
their palms so that the palms touch. But children diagnosed as autistic tend to put their hands
with their palms facing themselves! They imitate from their own point of view. This indicates
that the description of empathy as the ability to take the other’s perspective should be taken
literally - not metaphorically! In one experiment a preverbal infant was watching an
experimenter unsuccessfully trying to knob off a dumbell-like object. When the child was
given the opportunity, it immediately tried to and succeeded to knob it off and seemed pleased
at the result (Stern 2004). Thus the whole intentional complex of motivation and emotion is
transferred. This is action understanding - an interesting form of understanding since it relies
on implicit knowledge and takes place without conscious effort. We automatically perceive
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movements as intentions and things as invitations to act. This is done by co-producing these
movements/actions in our own body, living the intention.
Mirror Neurons and Empathy
Neurophysiological studies on monkeys revealed 1992 mirror neurons in the frontal lobe
firing as the monkey watches movements related to hand and mouth (Di Pellegrino et al.
1992). The very same neurons fire when the monkey performs the same movements. Hence it
seems that when the monkey observes hand movements that are part of its repertoire, the seen
action is automatically retrieved (without having to be executed) in the motor system. Mirror
neurons thus prepare us for imitating motor sequences (Rizzolatti et al. 2001). These findings
provide additional understanding of entrainment – sharing of the present moment. This
sharing occurs when the mirror neurons fire as a consequence of the actions of the other.
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There is strong evidence from fMRI and other studies that mirror neurons exist in humans (for
a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). As in the dum-bell experiment referred to earlier,
experiments have shown that monkeys, like humans, can infer the goal of the action, even if
the visual information is incomplete. Supporting evidence in humans is found in a group of
patients with prefrontal lesions (Lhermitte, 1983). These patients will compulsively imitate
gestures or even complex actions performed by an experimenter. This behaviour has been
explained as an impairment of the inhibitory control normally exerted on the elementary
motor schemata.
Several theoretical models have been proposed for the mirror neuron system, but we need not
go into the controversial issues. We will use the term sensorimotor schema to refer to the
whole complex of perceptual memories and motor schemata which is involved in the
perception of an action and in the execution of the same action. The correspondence between
the sensory and motor components of such a schema cannot always be perfect, since it is
obvious that in many cases an observed action can at most be partly mapped onto an existing
motor schema. Else we would never have to learn to perform.
As Kosslyn (1993) and others have argued, the neural substrates of perception and
imagination overlap to a large degree. Hence it is natural to ask whether sensorimotor
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schemata are activated when we only imagine an action. The following quote from Marc
Jeannerod suggests that this is the case:
…mental images, at least in the visual modality, rely on the same neural
substrate as the perceptual images that are generated during normal perception.
…motor imagery pertains to motor physiology in the same way as visual
imagery pertains to visual physiology… motor images must also be considered
to be functionally related to the imagined movement. Jeannerod (1994:  )
 Jeannerod cites a convincing example of the connection between imagery and motor skill
fetched from the field of sport:
Yue and Cole (1992) compared the increase in muscular strength produced by
actual training (repeated maximal isometric contractions) and by mental training
(imagining the same effortful contractions). In both conditions, the maximal
force produced by the trained muscles increased significantly (by 30% and 22%,
respectively). (ibid.:  )
In 2002 Stephanie Preston and Francis de Waal published an article on empathy introducing
the PAM – model (Perception – Action Model), influenced by the findings of mirror neurons.
The article is treating empathy as a communication of an emotion from one person to the
other so that the emotion evoked in the subject is the same as the emotion of the other. The
authors argue
[that] attended perception of the object’s state automatically activates the
subject’s representations of the state, situation, and object, and that activation
of these parameters automatically primes or generates the associated and
somatic responses, unless inhibited. (Preston & deWaal 2002:4)
The “object” in this quote is “the other”. The importance of imitation to empathy is stressed
by the notion that expression, and recognition of expression and gestures are impaired in
individuals with autism. And, even more, by the observation that autistic infants lack in
coordination of activity with their caregiver.
The authors present a list of catalysts facilitating empathy:
 Similarity
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 Familiarity
 Cue salience
Among the invited commentaries published with this article, Iacobini and Lenzi ) report that
they have identified areas with mirror properties in the human brain (the fronto-parietal
circuit). When imitation and observation tasks were compared, they found a complete spatial
overlap of activation between imitation and observation. The only difference was the
magnitude of the response. This part of the brain is connected to the insula which has a
…key role in affect generation and serving as a relay between frontal cortices
and limbic structures, thus representing a possible pathway for empathic
resonance. Iacobini and Lenzi (2002)
It is generally thought that just because mirror neurons have been found in restricted areas,
this does not mean that they are not present elsewhere. For mirror neuron theory to be
applicable to music and emotion we would need proof that the theory is not restricted to
visual perception. And, in October 2003 the discovery of audiovisual mirror neurons was
reported. They represent actions independently of whether these actions are performed, heard
or seen (Keysers et al. 2003).
All and all, the research could be summed up in a simple, symmetrical and reversible general
model.
EmotionMotor activityAudiovisual informationMotor activity Emotion
For this general model to be applicable to music we need to show that it makes sense to
contemplate music as implicit knowledge. This entails that
 music is movement
 music movement is an expression of emotion
 music movement can be imitated through entrainment
Who is imitated? And, what about the conditions – similarity, familiarity, cue salience,
entrainment and intentionality? How do they operate in music? Since this is a new approach
to music and emotion, there is little research to refer to. The following is anchored in the first
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author’s own practical experience of the profession of music, including composing, recording,
concerting, rehearsals, suffering, and the bliss of sharing emotions with audiences. We are not
testing of the truth of the theory, but merely discussing how reasonable it is to apply it to
music, how it agrees with professional and everyday observations of music, and discussing
what the implications would be.
Application to Music
Music as movement. An obvious feature in music is that it makes people move. We jog,
dance, run, pump weights, play air guitar, and mime in skipping-ropes to music (some of us).
Rap music is largely a way to move, even to the extent that there is a fashion of lose cloths to
go with this lax rhythmic pattern. Rhythm in beat music is indissolubly connected to dance
moves. There is a connection between popular music and the construction of the human body.
If you cannot move to it, it is no good. How can we explain this connection between music
and movement?
To play an instrument is to get involved in an acoustic-haptic-somatic system. For a guitarist,
this includes:
  Exterospecific information: The feeling of the guitar in her lap. This feeling is an
essential part of the musical experience of the performer, as is the feeling and
resistance of the strings.
 Propriospecific information: The posture of the body when she plays the instrument,
which involves necessary balance, coordination of fingers and relaxation to be able to
use the best technique.
  Expropriospecific information: The relation of the active body to the guitar – the
sensory feedback from the instrument to her body as she attacks the strings with her
nails in combination with the acoustic feedback.
Musicians have to move to produce music. Move their hands over the instrument. Move their
entire bodies to sing, or to blow wind or brass instruments. In fact, if we were to invent a
device to register in sound how a person is moving her fingers over a table, we would end up
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with something like the piano. The instrument registers the attack, the direction (left-right),
the intervallic leaps, number of fingers used, the spread of the fingers and the speed as
sounds; as well as very subtle nuances in tempo and touch. Every heard change in pitch and
dynamics corresponds to a movement by the player. This goes for any instrument including
the voice. Thus we can state that music is heard musician movement. Movement is immanent
in the heard information.
The sensorimotor schemata – memories of perceptions partly mapped as patterns of
movement – are, when applied to music, to be considered as the sedimentation of all music
the subject has heard so far - the soundtrack of her life. The sensorimotor schema is relevant
to intriguing phenomena in music:
1. It helps us to recognize sound sequences produced by human beings, not only
structure but also continuous nuances. Our capacity for voice recognition is
particularly well developed. We are able to identify a voice as a voice and separate it
from other sounds. Even very ambitious strivings to produce artificial voices are
revealed. Prosody is extremely hard to fake artificially. We also detect dialect and
identity of speaker, and the emotion and intention of this speaker. This sensitivity to
voices should according to action-perception theory be due to our highly developed
motor ability to produce vocal sounds (the similarity condition for empathy).
2. It explains the automated connection between a heard tone and the motor
production of this tone. We can step up to the piano, play a tone and then
immediately sing it. A choir leader can give the voices tone and the whole choir starts
singing at commando. Almost anyone can imagine a tone and then sing it. The
explanation is that hearing it or imagining it is to rehearse the motor action latently
without being aware of it.
3. It works as a comparison tool in music technique training and embodies the
results of this training. The sensory component of the schema can work as the goal
of the interaction player-instrument - the imagined “vision” of the sound – the ideal
sound. For the professional player this goal or another ideal prototype is never
achieved but she closes in on it during years of training. The learning process is
automatic and deliberate imitation, but also other conscious work which gradually
becomes automated. Training makes the player as sensitive to the sound quality of the
instrument as others are to voices. Technique is to reach the imagined goal with a
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maximum of precision with a minimum of effort. The player feels control and this
interaction with the instrument is confirming her musical self as a co-perception of the
sound. This grace is not achieved until the playing is absolutely deliberated from
conscious effort. When we see this in a player, we will get the impression of elegance,
or even grace. The sense of perfection – accuracy in hitting the pitch, tight rhythm,
perfect sound - is an aesthetic impression in its own right and as such part of our
enjoyment of music. As listeners we transmit this accuracy to our own bodies. This
may be an explanation of the bodily felt satisfaction in listening to well performed
music. Basically it is the same bodily satisfaction as when we manage to hit a target
perfectly – the sensation of a perfect backhand volley. It is the feedback of success
telling our bodies: This is how to do it! We feel the elegance of the move. Thus a
living good performance is a confirmation of the musical self, not only of the
performer but of the listener as well.
4. It is a tool for anticipating the action of the other. Years of training and listening
render the artist a repertoire of sensorimotor schemata. She has an implicit knowledge
of where the music is heading. The primed motor pathways of the listener resonate
with the motion of the music as she listens. Music, even when complex, is recycling of
limited material according to implicit rules connected to style and genre. This creates
expected chord progressions (such as vamps), expected instrumental melodies (such as
guitar riffs) and expected melodic moves. Thus there is both recognition from earlier
heard music and recognition from the music at hand (the familiarity condition).
5. It makes imitation possible. A trained pianist can imitate another pianist by ear. She
imitates the sound, but in doing so she has to re-produce the movement. This imitation
has two steps: First, she is imitating the movement latently as she listens to it. The
experienced instrumentalist feels the acoustic-haptic-somatic system of the other in
her own body. Second, she does a deliberate imitation and when doing so the memory
of what she just heard is still in her fingers. Musicians’ amazing capacity to imitate by
ear proves that the movement is communicated. In this sense music is choreography.
The intention to imitate is conscious. The how to do this is implicit knowledge. A
problem to be addressed is the fact that different instruments demand different
movements, which can be referred to the similarity condition. The melody creates
separate choreographies on different instruments. Thus there is no simple general
relation between melody and body movement. This objection does not overthrow the
fact that the information of movement is implicit in the music. Can the average listener
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perceive this movement? Obviously we move to the music heard. Even people that are
not musically trained can sing and thus imitate a singer, or even imitate an instrument
by voice. We know implicitly how to move our bodies to produce not only rhythm and
pitch but also the timbre of voices and instruments. Strangely, music seems to be
spatially related to the body. Trevarthen (1999) reported on a 5-month baby, born
blind, who “without prompting or training, and, indeed without her mother being
aware of her graceful rhythmic gestures, conducts portions of the melodies” of her
mother’s nursery songs, with her left arm and hand. The baby raised her arm and
spread her fingers as the verses were swelling in excitement and dropped her hand
when the stanza ended. This is a perfect example of Sterns intermodal vitality affect.
Most of us perceive “high” notes as spatially high and “low” notes as spatially low.
There is an observable tendency in listeners to imitate the base drum with their feet
and the melody with the upper body. The spatial relation to sound is reinforced by
seeing the movements of the artist, the musicians, the dancers, and the conductor on
stage, as well as the movements of the rest of the audience. Music is thus in the
concert situation a multimodal communication of movement, even including vibration
sense when you can feel the base drum “rearrange your bone structure”. However and
most important, even when the direction of the movement of the listener seems to be
chosen spontaneously, the vitality quality and contour of the movement is still
imitated.
6. It is used in improvisation. The expected continuation is so strong that it is heard and
can be instantly imitated. Musicians just play the protention of the perception as a
natural continuation. Improvisation can be a play with expectances, where the
musician deceives and deludes the audience with artistic deviances from expected
outcomes. This is possible because she has so many sensorimotor schemata as
solutions to every now in the music. Even this is implicit. This renders richness to the
music, surprise – wonder. It is noted by smiles and eye contact between musicians. It
can be derived from the socio-dramatic communication between mother and child
(Trevarthen 1992:128), described as a playful intersubjectivity. It is the play. It is like
the unforeseen move of Ronaldinho. In jazz we see it in the in-out technique when the
soloist plays for a while outside the harmony. This can be overtly observed as a bodily
movement sideways as if the musician for a while stepped out of her body – choosing
an alternative way. In flamenco the unexpected move is commented by the
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connoisseur’s introvert murmuring – olé - as recognition of duende (Spanish, literally
meaning goblin or elf - the presence of magic) (Martin 1973:43).
7. And this is also to a large extent what composers of popular music do. “It just comes
to me”. Composing thus, is a conscious selection between possible continuations that
make themselves heard.
Except from these heard and seen movements of the performers, music is movement in a
second sense: A special case of Gestalt relevant to music is the principle of closure. This
creates immanent dramaturgy. A spoken phrase can be open as in a question (upwards in
pitch) or closed as in a statement (downwards). This call-response pattern is an archetype in
music. The well-known four-bar II-V-I chord progression in jazz is harmonic closure. There
are so many clichés in music for closing the present phrase (cadences, half cadences, riffs
etc.) The entire song in western popular music is consists of phrases sequenced in longer rows
of progressions to a final closure. This is perceived as motion because closure is expected. We
perceive the direction to this closure. Listening to popular music is like walking in a familiar
environment. It is the play between variant and invariant information as the landscape unfolds
(Gibson 1986). We expect the things we see to have a closure (and not to continue endlessly
in the invisible field) and as we move this hunch (perceived expectancy) is verified. Finally
we are back where we started – home - the closure of the whole piece. Since the musical
journey is not actually spatial, it is no real movement. But it is more than a metaphor since it
is perceived as a longings, tensions, forces and movements.
Salient cues: So far we have commented on two of the conditions for communication of
emotions: similarity (as knowledge of the instrument) and familiarity (as knowledge of the
music). What about salient cues? Of course there are many cues to entrain in music. The most
important one is rhythm, since rhythm generally facilitates entrainment (cf. note iv).
Experiments have shown that a person tends to move her limbs in ratios of 1/1, 1/2, 1/3 or 2/3.
This has been referred to as self-entrainment  (Port et al. 1996). It has been proposed that self-
entrainment is due to “a natural and nearly unavoidable temporal constraint for systems of
mutually coupled oscillators” (op. cit.). If so, we have a biological ground for the ratios in
musical rhythms making up to the discrete time intervals in music. This is how we naturally
move our limbs when we play and dance. Rhythmically complex music like flamenco reveals
that the skilled musician is able to coordinate highly complex ratios. Intriguingly, ratios are
also what the natural tone system is built from, making up the discrete intervals in scales.
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Together these two variables constitute a coordinate system with discrete pitch over discrete
time – the musical score. Although the combinations are innumerable there are in western
popular music just 12 possibilities in pitch within the octave and about 16 possibilities in each
bar for every occurrence of an event. The discrete quality of music cuts down the number of
possibilities for the next event in a melody (pitch) from a continuum (endless possibilities) to
a limited number of what and when.
v
 This renders cues to entrain. The most salient cue of all
in popular music is of course the base drum insisting now, now, now - until we know exactly
when the next now is going to happen – creating this now-trance. But all the other events are
ratios of durations between these beats. And the larger forms are multiples of it. We know
where the now is. And thus we know where we are in the music as a co-perception. We feel
the sixteenth notes clicking, even in the breaks. Not approximately but exactly. The time cue
is implicit in the music. The rhythmic cue in beat music is so salient that this alone triggers
entrainment and opens up the listener to emotional responsiveness; and at times to trance, to
possession of deities, to therapeutic music communication where no other communication
works, and to mass psychological suggestion. Sublime experiences in music are often
reported as a loss of the sense of time (Gabrielsson 2001). We may recall here that shared
temporality is a condition for the communication of Sterns vitality affects.
Communication in the concert is not only communication from the stage to the individual
listeners. It synchronizes the listeners to one body - to one moving mass. The single listener is
just as affected by the mass as by the music. Known mass psychological effects are a lowering
of self consciousness and critical thinking and an increase in spontaneity and emotions.
Michail Bakhtin wrote about the medieval carnival:
The mass of the carnival is a popular unity…sensual and concrete…the crowd
in itself, the very physical contact between the bodies. The individual… a limb in
a crowd. In this unity the individual body to a certain extent ceases to be itself:
you could so to say exchange bodies, renew yourself (by means of masks and
costumes). At the same moment the people experience their sensual, concrete
and material bodily unity and community. (Bakhtin 1986)
Bakhtin emphasized the loss of individuality – the body is exchangeable in masses. What
happens when individuals become a mass is interpersonal entrainment in full scale, uniting
the individual movements, emotions and intentions to one movement, emotion and intention.
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This can take any direction as in mobs or in religious/political meetings. Hate or love and
anything in between. Everything said about entrainment so far is strengthened and
pronounced when the entrainment involves an audience of individuals and transforms them
into a mass. When an artist expresses love, her love thus can embrace the whole audience and
even be enriched by the mass. There is an audience feed back to the artist creating
superconductivity.
A drumbeat in a rock festival is not a monotone copy of something already heard and known,
but every time a unique event enriched by all the other drumbeats. Where the analytical
listener feels bored of the monotonous repetition, the listener entrained is captured in the
present moment trance of 80.000 colleagues and throws his head more violently at each
individual beat as if that particular beat was the ultimate experience. And this very beat
explodes as he leaves the earth with a jump in a sustained n-o-o-o-o-w. And there he sails in a
body no longer named Patrick, or Betty - but We. And the drum is no longer on stage but
beats inside We.
Intention. Why do we have music? What is the purpose? There is no obvious Darwinian
cause. This touches an old problem with our understanding of music. It is hard to see the
intention. Probably intention is as manifold in music as in other human behaviour. Connected
with this question are two other questions: Who is “the other” in music? and - What is the
perspective from which this other is acting? We are helped by the lyrics, if there are lyrics and
sometimes by the occasion (wedding, funeral, political manifestation etc.). The feelings
towards the artist are vital to the experience of the music. Knowledge of the biography helps
us identify the other. Often enough the artistic production is a biography in itself. Media
provide an image. Here too the conditions familiarity (knowing the artist, experience of the
situation) and similarity (the artist is one of us) are important for action understanding and
sharing.
Let us recall Ingemar Bergman’s imaginative proposal that music provides us with an idea of
other worlds than the one we inhabit.  It is obvious that a large body of music expresses a
longing for other worlds – nostalgic reminiscences of childhood, innocence, home, mother,
love, pure nature, etc., or a religious longing to a future Heaven. Maybe the reason why music
so often lends it self to this, lies in its potential to express longing by means of rows of
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disharmonic chord progressions, hindering the anticipated resolution. And, more important, as
we entrain the present now, critical thinking is diminished and emotions and spontaneity is
reinforced. This means that music has the power to bridge the ontological cleft, manifest in
self consciousness, between our selves and the world. Paradise is a construction from episodic
memories of perceiving the world directly. Significantly, it was the tree of knowledge that
caused us to be expelled from the biblical Paradise. Music by means of entrainment has the
power to reinsert this direct state, and thus to give us reminiscences of paradises lost. Music
thus allows us to put ourselves in resonance with the world. The Laplander sings his jojk for
no one - and for the whole world. We can pick up the guitar and play a song just for enjoying
the sound - and to communicate with the evening. The urge for self expression is surely a
fundamental drive in all human beings. If we should understand this in terms of intention we
probably have to go down to a very deep and generally not conscious motive – the drive to
connect. We think Stern’s term vitality affect is well found because the force of life penetrates
all expressions of feelings. This takes so many creative forms. The artist’s cry for connection
is one. The unspoken intention in a rock concert is to express the emotion on stage and
involve thousands in this emotion, to touch them, to move them. The thin naked body of a
Mick Jagger crying out: Look at me, I am singing my life here: my anger, my sufferings and
my love. I give my heart to you. I am bleeding for you. This is a rite, a feast, a communion, a
sacrifice - shared mythological experience. We embody the artist ritually. It is com-union and
e-motion. He becomes us. His anger and suffering is our anger and suffering. We share this
life, united in motion.
Still, we cannot ignore that music can move us even if we do not have any idea of who the
other is and consequently do not discern any obvious intention. This leaves two alternatives:
Either music experience shows, contrary to what the imitation theory is proposing, that we
can be affected by pure expression without perceiving an intention, or intention is implicit in
the musical expression. The two aspects of musical movement (the movement of the musician
and the anticipated closure) are intertwined in the sense that listeners follow culturally learned
musical paths (sensorimotor schemata) to expected universal goals (gestalt closure). Is this a
situation where the listener can discern the intentional goals or end-states necessary for
implicit action understanding?
Is music movement an expression of emotion? Music-psychological research shows that
listeners reliably discern emotional categories (Gabrielsson & Lindström 2001). To take one
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example: Melancholy/sadness is, in music as in prosody, the universally best communicated
emotion. In music, melancholy is low register, legato, minor chords, small melodic leaps, low
volume, lack of dynamics, slow, monotone and firm rhythm. Halftone movements
(chromatics) and disharmonic (unsolved) chords are particularly melancholy. The richness of
variables studied (multivariate analysis technique) gives us a hint of how many variables we
“weigh together” in our perception of music without being conscious about it. The parameters
studied are said to be structural features and the communication of emotions is understood as
a decoding of these structures as signs. But, when we take a closer look at musical parameters,
we find that with few exceptions they could very well be analysed as movements - as vitality
affects. Intervallic leaps are the size of the movement. Legato is a description of the
smoothness of the motion. Volume is, as pitch, related to intensity of the motion. Rhythm is
the regularity of the motion. Dynamic change is the vitality contour of motion, and so on. As
we can see, it is through vitality affects - in the case of melancholy, lack of vitality – that the
emotional category is perceived. Emotional category is just another name for a certain
combination of dynamic features, or – a certain combination of motions in the imitating
listener: sensorimotor schemata. Also, we think the Stern relation affect is due to affect
attunement and thus dependent on vitality affects. We love the artist because we have shared
present moments of implicit action understanding with her. Thus it is wrong to think of
category, relation and vitality affect as independent – at least when it comes to music. The
vitality affects seems to be primary, underlying the others.
Traditionally, listening to music in emotional contexts in film, advertising, computer games
etc. is thought to render signs of emotion. But we think these connections are usually
automated into the perception resulting in instant feelings, instead of coding representations of
emotion. As we listen, our total knowledge, implicit and explicit, affects perception. Let us
take the general model: Emotion _ Motor activity _ audio-visual information _ Motor activity
_ Emotion, and apply it to the communication of fear in music. The sensorimotor schemata of
fear in the composer are intermodally transformed to musical dynamic patterns, these resonate
with the sensorymotor schemata of fear in the listener and produce fear in her. The prototype
of fear in music could be heard in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho.
fear: sensorimotor schemamusic: attack, staccato, high pitch, loudness sensorimotor schema: fear
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Now the critical reader may remark: “Are we really to believe that the composer is scared
when he is composing?” There are several possibilities here. Either he is working in a flow of
inspiration and by imagination actualizes a sensorimotor schema for fear. Or, he is
consciously using expressions of fear as representations to reach the emotional effect, but in
doing so he experiences fear by means of feedback from these musical signs. In both cases the
sensorimotor schema is activated and implicitly leads his musical expression. For the listener
the result is the same.
Coda
Music is a perfect example of implicit knowledge. Composing, performing and listening to
music are largely bodily acts. Initially we stated that the philosophical consequence of a non-
semiotic approach would be that the emotion is implicit in the music as such. This is hard to
accept, but the sensorimotor schema could be the key to this understanding. We propose that
music is an auditory picture of the composer’s sensorimotor schema. This can be sedimented
in a music score or a phonogram and brought to life later and act on the sensory motor schema
of the listener. To be contaminated by music therefore does not necessarily demand the
presence of the other, even if this helps as additional information and action understanding.
When we listen to a record the artist is absent, so is the composer, still we entrain the flow.
Alfred Schütz once wrote:
Although separated by hundreds of years, the latter (the listener) participates
with quasi-simultaneity in the former´s (the composer’s) stream of
consciousness, by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of
his musical thought. The beholder, thus, is united with the composer by a time
dimension common to both. (Schütz quoted in Martin 1995:199)
We would say: Although the listener is separated from the composer by hundreds of years,
she synchronizes with an auditory picture of his sensorimotor schema. Perceptual expectation
makes her a co-composer - the motion and the emotion is shared. She, thus, is united with the
composer by means of entrainment of an auditory picture of his present moment. And being
united with the other’s present moment is, as we have argued, to (partially) share perspective,
motion and emotion.
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Music moves us. Music is dancing us until the dancers vanish. Everything is movement. This
is our existence – gestures towards a dancing world.
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
                                                                                 Yeats
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Jan Almäng and Olle Edström for helpful comments.
References
Bachtin, M. 1982, L’oevre de François Rabelais et la culture populaire au Moyen Age et sou
la Renaissance. Gallimard, Paris.
Bråten, S. 1999, Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny (Studies in
Interaction). Cambridge University Press.
Cutting, J. E., Kozlowski, L. T. 1977, Recognizing friends by their walk: Gait perception
without familiarity cues. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society; 9:353–356.
Darwin, C. 1872, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. J. Murray, London.
Di Pellegrino, G. Fadiga L., Fogassi, L., Gallese V. & Rizzolatti G., 1992. Understanding
motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research, 71: 491-507.
Gabrielson, A. 2001, Emotions in strong experiences with music. Music and Emotion – theory
and research, edited by Juslin, P. & Sloboda, J., 431-449. Oxford University Press.
Gabrielsson, A., Lindström, E. 2001. The Influence of Musical Structure on Emotional
Expression, Music and Emotion, theory and research, edited by Juslin, P. & Sloboda, J., 223-
248. Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. & Jeannerod, M., From action to interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies
9:3-26.
Gallese, V. 2003, The Roots of Empathy: The Shared Manifold Hypothesis and the Neural
Basis of Intersubjectivity, Psychopathology, 36:171–180.
Gibson, J. J. 1986, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates., Hillsdale, New Jersey.
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T. & Rapson R. L. 1994. Emotional contagion. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
25
Husserl, E. 1966. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Husserliana Bd.10. Nij-
hoff, Den Haag.
Iacobini, M. & Lenzi, L .L. 2002, Mirror neurons, the insula, and empathy. Behavioural and
Brain Sciences 25:39-40.
Jeannerod, M. 1994. The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and
imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17 (2):187-245
Kamachi, M., Hill, H., Lander, K. & Vatikiotis-Bateson, E. 2003, 'Putting the face to the
voice': matching across modality. Current Biology 13, 1709-14.
Keysers, C., Kohler, E., Umilt, M. A., Nanetti, L. Fogassi, L., Gallese V. 2003, Audiovisual
mirror neurons and action recognition. Experimental Brain Research 153:628-636.
Kivy, P. 1989, Sound Sentiment, Philadelphia , PA: Temple University Press.
Kivy, P. 2002, Introduction to a philosophy of music. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Kosslyn, S.
1996, Image and brain: the resolution of the imagery debate. Bradford Books, Massachussets,
MA.Lhermitte, F., Pillon, B. & Serdan, M. 1986, Human autonomy and the frontal lobes: Part
1. Imitation and utilization behaviour: A neurological study of 75 patients. Annals of
Neurology 19: 326-34.
Malmgren, H. 2000, Rorschach’s idea of a ”movement” response in the light of recent
philosophy and psychology of perception. Rorschachiana 24:1-27.
Malmgren, H. 2004, Why the past is sometimes perceived, and not only remembered.
Philosophical Communications, Web Series, 31.
Martin J. 1978, El Arte Flamenco de la Guitarra, United Music Publishers Ltd, London.
Martin, P. 1995, Sounds & Society, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York.
Melzoff, A.N. & Moore, M.K., Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.
Science 1987:75-78.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945, Phénomenologie de la Perception. Gallimard, Paris.
Meyer B. M. 1956, Emotion and Meaning in music, The University of Chicago Press.
Neisser, U. 1994, The Perceived self : ecological and interpersonal sources of self-
knowledge, Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press
Port, R., Tajima, K., & Cummins, F., 1996, Self-entrainment in animal behaviour and human
speech. Online Proceedings of the 1996 Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
Conference. http:// www.cs.indiana.edu/event/maics96/Proceedings/Port/port/.html.
Preston S., deWaal F. 2002, Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases, Behavioural and
Brain Sciences, 25:1-20.
26
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. 2001, Perspectives – neurophysiological mechanisms
underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews/Neuroscience vol.
2:667-668.
Rizzolatti, G. & Craighero, L., 2004, The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of
Neuroscience 27:169-192.
Ryle, G. 1949, The Concept of Mind.
Scherer, K. R. 1998. Emotionprozesse im Mediencontext: Forschungsillustrationen und
Zukunfstperspectiven. Medienpsychologie, 10:276-293.
Snyder, B., 2000, Music and Memory, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Stern, D., 1985, The interpersonal world of the infant. New York, Basic Books.
Stern, D. 1993, The role of feelings for an interpersonal self, in The Perceived Self. Edited by
Ulrich Neisser, Cambridge University Press. 205-215
Stern, D. (1995), The Motherhood Constellation.  Basic Books, New York.
Stern, D. 2004. The Present Moment. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London.
Tagg, P. 1979. Kojak…50 seconds of television music: toward the ANALYSIS of AFFECT in
POPULAR MUSIC, Studies from the Department of Musicology, Gothenburg. No.2
Thaut, M. 2003, Neural basis of rhythmic timing networks in the human brain. In: Avanzini,
G., Faienza, C, Minciacchi, D., Lopez, L. & Majno, M., The neurosciences and music (Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 999), 364-373. New York Academy of Sciences,
New York.
Trevarthen, C. 1992, An Infant's Motives for Speaking and Thinking in the Culture. In A. H.
Wold (Ed.). The dialogical alternative , pp. 99-137. Oslo and Oxford: Scandinavian
University Press/Oxford University Press.
Trevarthen, C. 1993, The self born in intersubjectivity: The psychology of an infant
communicating, in The Perceived Self, edited by Ulrich Neisser, Cambridge University Press.
Trevarthen, C. Musicality and the Intrinsic Motive Pulse: Evidence of human psychobiology
and infant communication, Special Issue of Musicae Scientiae: rhythm, Musical Narrative
and Origins of Human Communication, 1999:157-213.
Zacksenhouse, M. 2001, Sensitivity of basic oscillatory mechanisms for pattern generation
and detection. Biolofical Cybernetics 85, 301-11.
27
                                                 
i
 The span of our experience of the present moment must not be confused with the duration of the experience
itself. The experience may change almost continually, even if each experience includes intentions and
protentions with a span of several seconds.
ii
 If this is true, dogs, obviously showing shame and guilt when they have done something wrong, are self
conscious.
iii
 The concept Vitality Affect was first introduced in Stern (1985)
iv
 How do mirror neurons relate to neural oscillators? Most probably, mirror neurons reflect the integrated action
of many adaptive oscillators which together constitute the primary interface with the other’s movement pattern.
But this is the topic of another paper.
v
 We will not discuss the use (especially in classical music) of small temporal deviations from these discretized
expectations in order to produce specific aesthetic and/or emotional effects.
